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1 Toward a relational ethic 
Kenneth ]. Gergen 
Introduction 
Several years ago I was having lunch with a philosopher friend, and described 
to her some of my theoretical work in social construction. The work focused 
on the way in which people together geq_erate interpretations of what is 
real, rational, and good. As I explained, such ideas have been inspiring to 
many people, because they remove the rational grounds for any authority -
whether secular or sacred - to dictate or determine what is true or good for 
all. A space is thus opened for the expression of all opinions. Yet, as I waxed 
enthusiastically about the implications of these views for science, education, 
and daily life, my companion grew quik When I paused for her reflections, 
I was met with a glowering silence. Finally, with clenched teeth, she let me 
know that she could no longer remain at the table with me. Dumbstruck, 
I pleaded to know the source of her' irritation. As she explained, she had 
relatives who had died in the Holocaust, and the ideas I expressed offered 
no means of resisting Nazi atrocities. For constructionists, she reasoned, 
there was no commitment to an ethic that could stand in the way of such 
evil. This was intolerable. 
We did work our way slowly through the entanglements of logic in such 
a way that we could complete the meal in relatively good terms. However, 
the experience was a powerful one, and its rev~rberations have continued 
to the present - now finding expression in the present offering. As I have 
now come to see it, we were caught that day within a tension of centuries' 
duration, reaching its zenith in the late 20th century. One might say we were 
still toiling with the outcome of the Enlightenment, in which the forces of 
reason and observation were set against religious beliefs. In the early 20th 
century, this tension emerged as the struggle between a secular and largely 
materialistic orientation to life and deep investments in spirituality, human 
values, and traditions of the sacred. As the century grew on, the Enlighten-
ment echoes could be located in various forms of pluralism as against vari-
ous efforts to sustain foundational values on the other side.1 
Such dialogues continue, but now with a new and far more sinister 
edge. In my view, the emerging plethora of globe-spanning technologies of 
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communication has radically intensified our differences. We have reached 
the point today at which values and beliefs have leaped from their geo-
graphical boundaries and are everywhere in conflict. Jet transportation ena-
bles one to relocate to virtually any other corner of the earth in less than 
24 hours. By virtue of the W:orld Wide Web, one may locate the like-minded 
in any geographical location, near or far. With email, one may remain in 
close contact with any acquaintance, no matter where they are. With smart-
phones we may instantly be in contact textually, auditorily, and visually. 
The result is that anyone seeking security in a tradition of value or belief can 
potentially locate around-the-clock support throughout the world. Commu-
nities of belief may thus engage in continuous reinforcement of their views, 
strengthening, intensifying, and expanding. With this solidification, all that 
is outside the wall of belief becomes alien, a potential threat. My luncheon 
colleague argued passionately, but hers is only one of myriad passions. As 
convictions spread and intensify, so the world becomes more deadly .. 
Paradoxically, however, these technologies that intensify a world of con-
flict also lend themselv~s to the deterioration of moral relevance. For large 
segments of Western culture, they undermine commitments to any belief or 
value whatsoever. Everywhere, individuals and organizations make strong 
claims to the moral high ground - in religion, politics, gender, race, and so 
on. All too often, such claims result in the demeaning, oppression, imprison-
ment, or murder of massive numbers of people. For those witnessing these 
effects, strong, passionate, or foundational claims to the good seem increas-
ingly dangerous. Indeed, an inflexible cbmmitment to any moral value seems 
childish or primitive.2 
More problematically, a resistance to fundamentalism also lends itself to 
moral indifference. 3 Righteous claims to the good pose a danger. And if 
every group can make claims to 'the good' in its own terms, then no one's 
claims have commanding force - this includes the claims of government, the 
law, the church, one's.parents, and so on. Thus "whatever I declare as good, 
is as legitimate as any other." Indeed, why should one bother inquiring into 
the good at all? Just live life"b--as it comes, fulfill yourself, and don't bother 
with the rest. This is a world in which public lying, embezzlement, profiteer-
ing, fraud, intimidation, money laundering, tax evasion, and the like are not 
particularly shameful. The only significant problem is getting caught. Such 
views - often equated with moral relativism -find little resistance in the cul-
ture. There are no strong arguments against them, save those of yet another 
foundationalist enclave. Because of their alliance with the Enlightenment, 
and their need to remain non-partisan, our schools offer few resources for 
moral deliberation. Slowly, the resources for an ethical consciousness are 
bled from society. 
We thus enter a period of history in which value commitments are mov-
ing in diametrically opposing ways. On the one hand, such commitments 
are moving toward an intense and globally threatening pitch; in stark con-
trast, in many enclaves of the world, value commitments are ceasing to be 
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regarded or relevant. How are we thus to proceed? We cannot easily fall 
back on any of the traditional religions for an answer, because their very 
claims to moral authority contribute to the situation at hand. Nor can we 
in the West dip into the repository of ethical positions - from Aristotelian 
virtues, Kantian imperatives, or human capabilities - to sustain a universal 
imperative. All are byproducts of Western culture, and thus suspicious for 
those outside that culture. And, on what grounds could they establish moral 
authority? Whose tradition would j_ustify these grounds? More directly rel-
evant to world conditions are ethical positions that favor generalized love or 
care for others - for example, a feminist ethics of care (Tronto, 2005), or a 
Levinasian entreaty to attend to "the face of the other" (Levinas, 2005). But 
even here we are left with enormous ambiguities in how an ethic of care for 
the other would play out if 'the other' wishes to restrict education to males, 
abandon a two-state solution, expel immigrants, or segregate the races. 
In what follows, I will open a space for an alternative orientation to eth-
ics, one that could blunt the attempts to impose ethics that would silence 
all others, but that could simultaneously reldhdle a concern with ethical 
deliberation. More precisely, I wish to generate an ethical standpoint that 
honors all visions of what is good or moral in human activity. At the same 
time, I will make no foundational claims for this meta-ethical standpoint. As 
ungrounded grounds, the proposal functioqs not so much as an imperative 
but rather as an invitation. Where will this take us? How would it benefit 
humankind or life on the planet more generally? What are we asked to 
sacrifice? The invitation to deliberation is inclusive. Yet, I do not view such 
delibera,tions as primarily conceptual in nature. The challenge here is not 
conceptual justification or a scholarly adventure into abstraction. Rather, 
the attempt is to explore the ethical implications in ongoing action. This 
means that neither a foundational commitment nor a relativistic insouciance 
will allow escape. The challenge lies in the way in which our actions play 
out together from moment to moment. 
To explore what I shall call- a relational ethic, I will first consider the 
origins of all moral orientations. This will invite an appreciation of the mul-
tiple and conflicting visions of the good now circulating the globe. It will 
also illuminate the closely related 'sources of evil.' This discussion sets the 
stage for considering the significance of relational process in giving rise to all 
moral orientations. Valuing this source of value thus serves as a meta-ethic. 
I then take up four domains of action that may ground the more abstract 
logic of relational ethics. This will allow us to confront the twin challenges 
of foundationalism and relativism. 
The relational origins of good and evil4 
The range of what humans have come to value/over the centuries is virtually 
boundless - from the love of gods, community, country, love, self-realization, 
and equality, on the more sweeping side; to family, gun ownership, privacy, 
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and football on the more specific. One might even find values deeply insinu-
ated into every movement of the day - from the hour of arising, to the choice 
of what one eats, to whom one speaks, to each of the websites visited as one 
traverses cyberspace. To be sure, we find many speculations about universal 
goods - for example, peace; benevolence, freedom, or sensual pleasure. But 
for any value that one identifies in such efforts, there are people in various 
conditions who will find war more desirable than peace, self-satisfaction 
more appealing than benevolence, control more helpful than promoting 
freedom, and asceticism more fulfilling than sensual pleasure. One is drawn, 
then, to the ineluctable conclusion that moral values are specific to various 
cultures or subcultures in various times and specific places. 
Such a conclusion is no small matter because it reveals what may be 
viewed as the primary source of values: human relationships. Whether any 
activity is a good in itself - possessing intrinsic value - remains conjectural. 
However, there is virtually no activity that some people at some time have 
not resisted. The valu~ of an activity does not emerge, then, from the activ-
ity in itself, but from the meaning it acquires in human interchange.5 In this 
sense, values acquire their meaning in the same way as language: partici-
pation in a social process. Virtually all relationships will generate at least 
rudimentary understandings of 'what is good for us.' They are essential to 
sustaining patterns of coordination. It should not be surprising, then, that 
the term ethics is derived from the Greek, ethos, or essentially, the customs 
of the people; or that the term morality draws from the Latin root, mos, or 
mores, thus equating morality with custom. Our constructions of reality 
walk hand in hand with our logics, and our moralities. 
Let us view this movement from rudimentary coordination to value for-
mation in terms of first-order morality. To function within any viable rela-
tionship will virtually require embracing, with or without articulation, the 
values inherent in its patterns. When I teach a class of students, for example, 
first-order morality is at work. We establish and perpetuate what has become 
the 'good for us.' There are no articulated rules in this case, no moral injunc-
tions, no bill of rights for itudents and teachers. The rules are all implicit, 
but they touch virtually everything we do, from the tone and pitch of my 
voice, my posture, and the direction of my gaze to the intervals during which 
students may talk, the loudness of their voice, and the movement of lips, legs, 
feet, and hands. One false move and any of us becomes the target of scorn. 
In effect, morality of the first order is essentially being sensible within a way 
of life.6 In the same vein, most people do not deliberate about murdering 
their best friend, not because of some principle to which they were exposed 
in their early years, and not because it is illegal. It is virtually unthinkable. 
Similarly, it would be unthinkable to break out in a tap dance at a holy mass, 
or to destroy a colleague's laboratory. To be sure, such ways of life may be 
solidified in our laws, sanctified by our religions, celebrated in our moral 
deliberations, and intensively articulated in ethical theory. We live our lives 
largely within the comfortable houses of first-order morality. 
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It is at this point that we also join hands with writings on moral or value 
pluralism. As often attributed to Isaiah Berlin (1991), we recognize the pos-
sibility of a range of fundamentally different, incommensurable, and poten-
tially conflicting traditions of morality. And, while pluralist writings are often 
equated with political liberalism - standing against fascism or absolutism of 
any·kind - less is said about 'origins of evil.' But consider: whenever people 
come into coordination, first-order morality is in the making. As we strive 
to find mutually satisfactory ways of going on together, we begin to estab-
lish a local good, "the way we do it." Simultaneously, the emergence of 'the 
good' creates an alternative of the less than good. A range of actions are now 
featured as off limits, or forbidden - a door behind which lies mystery. All 
children know the joy of breaking the rules, whispering in class, laughing at 
a prank, stealing a cookie. And what is forbidden always invites the curiosity 
of "what if .... " Further, there is rebellion against the tyranny of the enforcer. 
"Why can't I ... ?" "Who says I can't ... ?" "I don't take orders from you." 
The potential for immorality is furthered by the fact that most cultural 
traditions carry multiple values, variously impcfrtant or emphasized depend-
ing on context. We place a value on working hard, and on playing; on free-
dom, and on responsibility; on obedience, and on disobedience; on fitting in, 
and on being unique; on pleasing others, and on autonomy; and so on. Thus 
the stage is set for choosing the good, and simultaneously being scorned or 
punished for being bad. One should care f9r one's family, but may be jailed 
for stealing to fill their needs; women should have the right to abort, but be 
ostracized for doing so; a president should not lie, but will be protected by 
his colleagues if the lie enhances the power of their party. 'Bad actions' may 
always seem to be a 'good idea at the moment.' And, of course, we now 
confront the clashes of civilizations, as deeply entrenched traditions of the 
good come face to face, often finding a threatening evil in the other. 
Relational process: the ethical invitation 
As I am proposing, as people coordinate their actions, creating a way of 
life that will optimally be harmonious and nourishing, they are laying the 
groundwork for what we call moral action. In this sense, moral action is 
always under production, whether unstated and little regarded, or articu-
lated and staunchly defended. This also leaves us with the following paradox: 
the very production of first-order moralities als9 establishes the conditions 
for immorality. But whatever is immoral for one may be valued by another. 
In this sense, conflicting goods will always be with us. The challenge is not 
to achieve a conflict-free existence, but to locate ways of approaching con-
flict that do not bend toward mutual extermination. Given the challenge of 
moral apathy, are there means of inspiring moral engagement without the 
demands of singular commitment? 
1 
It is just here that we can return to the original source of moral com-
mitment, and indeed, meaning of any kind: coordinated action. The value 
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of harmonious relationships is scarcely new to ethical inquiry. However, 
almost invariably the ethic has restated on a fundamental assumption of 
separation. The ethically informed person acts toward others in a way that 
harmony will ensue: "I do unto others," "I am compassionate toward oth-
ers," "I am caring for others," and so on. By focusing on the emergence of 
human meaning, we shift 1£rom this traditional concern with individuals to 
the more fundamental process of relating. Out of this process, the very idea 
of individuals is created. Human communication is essentially the outcome 
of coordination among persons. Like language, moral leanings are not the 
product of any single person. They depend on relational process. Without 
this process, we have no religion, science, political institutions, commerce, 
education, or organizations. There is nothing to care about or live for - big 
or small. Regardless of tradition - existing or in the making - the positive 
potentials of this process are vital. If we all draw life from this process, then 
it demands our collective attention. Here we may speak of what should be a 
universal concern, the grounding for a relational ethic. 
Now consider the
1 
consequences of the paradoxical relation between 
'good and evil.' Most typically, challenges to a moral order are met with 
resistance. As children we are encouraged to 'be good' through rewards, 
and our failures are met with irritation, lectures, correction, penalties, anp 
physical punishment. In each case, a space of alienation emerges between 
the parties. Then there are the more heinous actions - robbery, extortion, 
rape, drug dealing, or murder. It is here we find a dangerous transforma-
tion in the quest for the good. In the case of these more threatening actions, 
an impulse toward elimination is often unleashed. This is typically accom-
plished through various forms of defense (surveillance, policing), curtail-
ment (imprisonment, torture), or, more radically, through extermination 
(death penalty, invasion, bombs). This shift from alienation to elimination 
can be accompanied by a sense of deep virtue. 
As we shift from alienation to elimination, we also undermine the poten-
tials of positive coordination. Placed in jeopardy is the process of coordi-
nation, from which reality;"rationality, and a sense of the good is derived. 
As the eliminative impulse is set in motion, and we move toward mutual 
annihilation, we approach the end of meaning. It is precisely here that a 
relational ethic becomes imperative. Required is participation in a process 
that can restore, sustain, and strengthen the possibility of morality making. 
In the embrace of a relational ethic, we sustain the possibility of morality 
of any kind. 
From the standpoint of a relational ethic, there are no individual acts of 
evil, for the meaning of all action is derived from relationship. Holding indi-
viduals responsible for untoward actions not only is misguided but results 
in alienation and retaliation. In the case of a relational ethic, individual 
responsibility is replaced by relational responsibility, or a responsibility for 
sustaining the potential for positive coordination (McNamee & Gergen, 
1999). To be responsible to relationships is to devote attention and effort to 
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means of sustaining the potential for co-creating meaning. When the wheels 
of individual responsibility are set in motion, relationships typically go off 
track. Blame is followed by excuses and counterblame. In being responsible 
for relationships, we step outside this tradition, and care for the relation-
ship becomes primary. In relational responsibility we avoid the narcissism 
implicit in ethical calls for 'care of the self' and as well, the self-negation 
resulting from the imperative to 'care for the other.' 
One may argue that this proposal for a relational ethic simply reconsti-
tutes the problems inherent in foundational ethics. Is this not equivalent to 
declaring that people ought to be responsible for the process of sustaining 
coordinated relationships? If so, is this not another hierarchy of the good in 
which the irresponsible are deemed inferior and in need of correction? Such 
a critique presumes, however, that lying beneath a relational ethic is some 
kind of moral authority, a bedrock on which it is established. There is no 
such foundation. The logics put forward here are themselves issuing from 
traditions of the good, no less socially constructed than all others. To be 
sure, the account provides a form of meta-dhic, but in the end it can only 
invite participation. It is not an authoritative pronouncement, but an invita-
tion to re-coordination. 
Relational ethics in practice 
Thus far the proposal for a relational ethic is abstract and minimally expli-
cated. Further development is needed, and this development should itself 
reflect the participation of many voices. To invite such discussion, what fol-
lows is an exploration of critical dimensions of ethical action. It is one thing 
to lay out a rationale for a meta-ethic, but what kind of actions would real-
ize its implications? What is it to 'act ethically' from a relational standpoint? 
While this question may seem transparent enough, preliminary attention is 
required. As we shall see, the traditional relationship between ethical theory 
and practice - with abstract formulations dictating action - is problematic. 
Simultaneously thrown into critical relief is the coqcept of moral agency. 
The philosophy of ethics has primarily been an exercise in language. 
Inquiries into 'what is the good' are exercises in discourse, with a reasoned 
account of ideal consciousness as the goal. An ethically informed conscious-
ness should provide the grounds for ethical action. Yet, there is a major 
problem inhering in these attempts, one that threatens their relevance to 
cultural life. This is the challenge of deduction: how one is to derive from 
a general category of the good - or an ethical consciousness:- a set of par-
ticular actions. The ideal category of the good provides no rules as to what 
counts as an instantiation. If one seeks to be kind, compassionate, tolerant, 
or appreciative, for example, what precisely is entailed in the way of action? 
What does one say, with what tone of voice;' with what direction of one's 
gaze, and with what posture or movements ~f the arms and hands? We may 
all agree that it is good to 'love one another,' but what it means to love 
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in terms of concrete actions varies dramatically - from a simple smile, to 
restricting a child's behavior, to smothering another in kisses, or smothering 
them with a pillow. 
The relational account developed here adds a further level of complex-
ity. One's actions in th~mselves do not count as kind, compassionate, or 
loving, for example. One's actions come into these meanings depending on 
the coordinated action of others. If one's self-considered action is 'com-
passionate,' and another reacts to it as 'condescension,' then it ceases for 
the moment to be compassion. Attention thus shifts from the traditional 
assumption of the 'moral agent' who engages in 'moral action' to morally 
rich processes of relating. 
It is here that Wittgenstein's landmark work, Philosophical Investiga-
tions, is of special significance. Placed in question by this work is the tra-
ditional view of language as a picture of the world. By abandoning this 
view, the problem of deduction is also eliminated. If our accounts of love, 
compassion, care, and so on are not pictures of the world, then there is 
no problem of del:lucing what counts as instantiations of these accounts. 
In Wittgenstein's outline of a use-based account of language, our attention 
shifts to the pragmatic uses of ethical languages in ongoing social life. Ethi-
cal philosophy, cut away from 'contexts of application,' runs the risk of 
irrelevance. The most sophisticated theories of the good may undermine 
their potential through their very sophistication. 
Thus, in what follows, I wish to explore four domains of ethical action 
from a relational standpoint. In each case, I attempt to wed conceptual ide-
als to practices of relationship. 
Caring communication 
If the primary value is placed on processes of relating that foster, sustain, 
and enrich the process of relating itself, then major attention shifts to our 
practices of communication. What forms of communication can achieve 
these ends? How can 'Me relate with each other in ways that care for the 
relationship itself? When there is shared agreement on a way of life, com-
mon, civil communication may itself nourish relationship. The simple par-
ticipation in a traditional way of life together symbolically honors 'our way.' 
To chat lightly with Emily, the cashier at the local grocery store, may seem 
a trivial event, but it is the kind of glue that holds the community together. 
At the same time, there is a sustained tendency toward fragmentation in 
any culture, with those sharing tradition drawing together in separation 
from others. On university campuses, for example, communication within 
departments of study far eclipses communication across departments. In 
corporations, there are separations in terms not only of management lev-
els, but of the functions served (e.g., operations, marketing, R&D). Wher-
ever people organize - in government, religion, hospitals, schools, and so 
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on - there are tendencies toward separation. In effect, there may be care 
within various enclaves, but relations among them are threatened. 
It is here that we may appreciate the ethical implications of far-reaching 
efforts to enhance collaborative practices. In universities, there is increas-
ing reliance on collaborative research; in technology labs is now the major 
source of creativity; in classrooms collaborative projects are now common 
forms of teaching; many therapists now see their relationship with clients 
as a collaboration; in healthcare there is a shift toward collaboration across 
specialties, with the patient now included as part of the team; military top-
down structures of command and control are giving way to linking col-
laborating teams; and in business, the practice the need for collaborative 
leadership is increasingly realized. To this we must add international col-
laborations to combat global warming, protect wildlife habitats, control 
the spread of diseases, coordinate air traffic, and much more. As practices 
of collaboration become,instilled into the routines of daily life, we embody 
a relational ethic. For more on relevant practices of dialogue and collabora-
tion, see Skeie (Chapter 10 in this volume), van Nileijl (Chapter 11 in this 
volume), and M. Gergen (Chapter 12 in this volume). 
Conscience: responsible to all 
One might take a dim view of relational ethics c;m the grounds that it stands 
for so little in itself. Where are the hard questions of the world - questions 
of human rights, the rise of fascism, racism, and so on? To be sure, nothing 
within a relational ethic provides a foundation for voicing either support or 
resistance in such cases. At the same time, however, there are no founda-
tional arguments against voicing preferences in any such cases. This is not 
for a lack of what might be called 'conscience' within the relational orienta-
tion. On the contrary, a relational ethic calls for an overflowing conscience. 
That is, to champion relational process is to treat with respect the intelli-
gibility of all participants, even when other views are disagreeable. It is to 
carry the voices of all value orientations, to respect their validity within the 
circumstances in which those values were created. Every voice of value, no 
matter how heinous to others, carries the assumption of its own good. To 
be relationally responsible is to defend the rights of all to make themselves 
intelligible. One may surely resist what is seen as 'evil action,' but with 
a sense of humility -with respect to both one's own lack of fundamental 
grounds and the realization that, under identical circumstances, a similar 
choice could have been made. 
What would this expanded form of conscience mean in action? It would 
favor, for example, supporting movements for social justice, for minority 
rights, or against tyranny of any kind, but without pathologizing those who 
might be targets of such movements. It would be to1support those who speak 
out against sexual harassment, but respecting the possibility of alternative 
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intelligibilities. In many cases, a relational ethic would lend support to the 
expression of multiple goods. Thousands are escaping the bloodshed and 
poverty in their home countries and seeking entry - often illegal - into other 
lands. The legal voice is relevant to such conditions, but it should function 
as only one voice among many. Here it is important that multiple expres-
sions be set in motion, including those of the immigrants, citizen enclaves, 
economists, religious figures, educators, and so on. 
Creativity: confiuence in motion 
A relational ethic is an. ethic of improvisation and innovation. It is an ethic 
of improvisation because the daily challenge of sustaining harmonious rela-
tions with others requires continuous agility. At base, every conversation is 
a novel event. The words that are spoken, the way they are spoken, and the 
context in which they occur are always new. This means that all utterances 
harbor a certain ambiguity; one's interlocutors may shift the direction of 
I 
their meaning in many ways. What seems to be a compliment may be con-
strued by its recipient as a subtle criticism, a way of currying favor, a means 
of demonstrating superiority, an act of kindness, or something else alto-
gether. And responses to this seeming compliment may also be construed 
in many ways. Whether the pair emerges from the conversation as cari'ng 
companions or alienated acquaintances depends on coordination in impro-
visational skills. 
A relational ethic also favors innovative action. This is so because all tra-
ditions of the good are limited in their forms of action. One may be taught 
from an early age that 'giving to the poor' is commendable. One may thus 
be drawn by the plight of the beggar on the street, and feel pangs of guilt 
in hurriedly passing by. It would not occur to one in this tradition that giv-
ing is an evil. And yet, for inner city workers attempting to reduce drug 
dependency, this i_s a warranted conclusion. Food and shelter are available 
to the homeless, it is argued. Money that is begged is likely to maintain a 
drug habit. The point here is especially important in terms of attempts to 
bridge contrasting moral traditions. If traditions are limited in their forms 
of action, then bridging work requires innovation - the creation of forms of 
action that may invite participation from differing traditions but be new to 
all. This is particularly relevant in the context of the global clash of moral 
traditions and the ensuing bloodshed. What Alma (Chapter 4 in this vol-
ume) calls a moral imagination is required. We may thus applaud the work 
of various groups - in peace building, community building, interreligious 
dialogue, mediation, witnessing, repatriation, and the like - attempting to 
create new forms of dialogue. Rather than settle for the "natural ways we 
talk with each other," they consciously set out to create new forms of. inter-
change for building or restoring viable relations. Such efforts should not be 
limited to grassroots organizations, as they often are, but should also be 
shared by major institutions of business and government. Especially related 
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to issues of leadership, see also ter Avest (Chapter 5 in this volume) and van 
Loon and Buster (Chapter 6 in this volume). 
Continuation: process over outcome 
There is a strong tradition in Western culture to seek decisive conclusions. 
It is within this tradition that truth, as a singular and universal account of 
the world, has had a prevailing sway. And it is within this context that the 
discourses of principles, certainty, clarity, resolution, resolve, grounding, 
outcomes, solutions, and scores have played a contributing role. All such 
discourse lends itself to final fixing, certain knowledge - ensuring a 'last 
word.' From a relational standpoint, a last word is no word at all, as its 
meaning will not be revealed until others coordinate with it in some way. 
A last word is the end of conversation, the end of communication, and thus 
the end of meaning. From a relational standpoint, then, the action focus is 
not on ultimate outcomes, but in the continuing conversation. 
Here the work of Catholic theologian David"'l"Tracy is illuminating. As 
Tracy (1987) points out, there is a strong tendency in the major religious 
traditions to fix the nature of God, good and evil, the nature of human 
beings, the universe, and so on. Religious texts such as the Bible or the 
Qur'an are often used in this way. As Tracy argues, however, such texts 
always permit multiple interpretations. Not only are the texts inherently 
ambiguous, but the differing assumptions, values, visions, and so on that 
the reader brings to the text will permit or invite different interpretations. 
For Tracy, this is not a failing, but an invitation to increase the richness of 
the text. Thus, the readings of texts within various traditions "are different 
construals of Ultimate Reality itself" (Tracy, 1987, p. 90). For Tracy this is a 
clarion call to interfaith dialogue, as multiple construals add enriching lami-
nations to our understanding and to the potentials for spiritual life (Tracy, 
1991). For Tracy, engaging in such qialogue is itself a spiritual action. Also 
see Ipgrave (Chapter 8 in this volume) for a discussion of the significance of 
plural interpretation. 
It is in this context that a relational ethic places a premium on the con-
tinuous process of relating. Issues of moral import should not be solved, 
thus permitting participants to retire with a sense of righteous satisfac-
tion. Rather, recognizing the ambiguity inherent in such decisions, and the 
potential for multiple standpoints, there should be no principled end to 
the conversation. In terms of action, such a logic· favors mediation over 
the structure of contention within the legal system. In the classroom, it also 
favors dialogic pedagogy with an emphasis on multiplicity in interpretation. 
Examinations and testing of students should be replaced by more relational 
processes that enlist multiple voices in an atmosphere of mutual respect. 
If properly conducted, it favors town meetings, 
1
and community-wide pro-
jects. In such practices we do not apply a relational ethic; we embody it in 
practice. 
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Beyond conclusions 
My attempt in this offering has been to find a means of pressing toward an 
ethical form of life that would avoid the way in which competing ethical 
positions invite extremist int9lerance and bloodshed on the one hand, and a 
moral lethargy on the other. The hope is that by bringing into focus the very 
origins of moral action, we might locate a process that could be embraced 
by all traditions. As proposed, moral action and ethical reasoning emerge 
within relational process. Thus, it is the life-giving potential within this rela-
tional process that must be placed in the forefront of concern. As also rea-
soned, ethical theory should not proceed, cut apart from the forms of life 
that might give it meaning. Thus, discussion was opened on various forms 
of action coherent with proposal for a relational basis of moral action. 
To be sure, many issues remain unexamined in this treatment. It may first 
be apparent that in explicating a relational ethic, most of the discussions in 
the domains of practice concerned the challenge of moral or ethical conflict; 
how to bring people together, sustain dialogue, collaborate, and so on. Little 
was said about the twin problem of pluralism, namely a lethargic relativism. 
What does a relational ethic offer to those who simply shrug their shoulders 
in the face of moral issues? It is cavalier to suppose that, even if introduced 
into our educational systems, the reasoning offered here for a relational 
ethic would invite a transformation in ethical sensitivity. But, as advanced 
earlier, ethics in the abstract are little more than language games. The chal-
lenge is to embed the abstractions within forms of cultural life. In my view, 
the beginning of ethical consciousness lies, then, in participation in ethically 
relevant forms of life. 
Most children learn at an early age not to lie, cheat, or steal, and for most, 
the lessons are sustained for a lifetime. Very few, however, would be able 
to provide an in-depth rationale for why these are unethical acts. Thus, in 
confronting the issuf; of moral lethargy, the primary emphasis may properly 
be placed on instituting forms of activity that privilege positive relational 
process. In education, as poi1ited out, pedagogies of collaboration are highly 
consistent with a relational ethic. Dialogic classroom practices can foster 
mutual understanding and tolerance, along with an appreciation for the cre-
ative outcomes of working together in groups. Much the same may be said 
of the increasing prominence of project learning, in which students work 
collaboratively toward a goal. Testing and grading practices generally work 
against generative relationships. They invite alienation and distrust among 
students, between students and teachers, and between students and their 
families. There is great advantage in replacing traditional assessment with 
practices of evaluation built into dialogic and collaborative processes, along 
with shared reflection on learning process (Gergen & Gill, forthcoming). In 
this case we build moral muscle not through declarations of the good, but 
through ethically informed practice. 
A second significant silence in the present account concerns cases of ille-
gal and/or onerous action. Consider here, for example, acts of pedophilia, 
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murder, or terrorism. While illegal and detestable, the actor can offer argu-
ments for their intelligibility. Now, much of the earlier discussion in this 
chapter presumed the possibility of interchange - the bridges for communi-
cation could be built between otherwise disagreeing parties. Mutual under-
standing and transformation might result. In the cases of actions of deep 
repugnance, such bridges would seem impossible. While one might come 
to understand why these acts were intelligible, they would still be roundly 
condemned, and incarceration enthusiastically endorsed. At the same time, 
such a conclusion would lead us into a cul de sac; it would suggest that a 
relational ethic is just fine until it isn't. Can we extend the ethic, then, to 
include cases of deep repugnance? Again, continuing discussion is needed; 
but again, we gain some purchase by considering realms of practice. The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, healing the wounds 
of apartheid, is exemplary. The increasing numbers of restorative justice 
programs also point in a promising direction. And a relational ethic would 
entail abandoning the death penalty. 
Yet, while opening a space for an over"ifrching ethical orientation, the 
present attempt is scarcely complete. It cannot be complete in principle, 
because if the attempt is itself coherent with the ethic it espouses, it is essen-
tial to sustain multiparty deliberation. One might say that the proposal is 
for an ever-emerging theory and practice. The present account is but the 
beginning of a conversation. 
Notes 
1 See also Taylor (2007) on the rise of the secular age. 
2 See also Stout (1988) on the failure of foundationalism and its contribution to 
moral malaise. 
3 A resistance to religious foundationalism is scarcely the result of multiple and 
competing claims. The general drift of the West toward secularism, often traced to 
the period of the Enlightenment, is clearly relevant (cf. Taylor 2007). Many hold 
that the secularist drift is now prevailing globally. As Bullard (2017) reports in 
National Geographic, the "world's newest great religion is no religion." 
4 A preparatory note: Concepts of 'the good,' the 'inoral,' and the 'ethical' are 
closely bound. In my view, the sense of 'good' functions as a primitive (we may 
find it 'good' to have peace and quiet); when the sense of good is codified or 
articulated we speak of it as 'morality' (it is a moral good that we don't disrupt 
others' wellbeing, for example, by playing loud music); and when we provide a 
conceptual account of why such morality is imperative, we enter the field of ethics. 
5 The remainder of this discussion draws from Gergen (2007, 2009). 
6 Also see McIntyre's (2007) discussion of the way in which these ways of life are 
realized in individual identity and responsibility. 
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